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ABSTRACT 19 
 20 
Approaches to understanding adaptive behaviour often assume that animals have perfect information 21 
about environmental conditions or are capable of sophisticated learning. If such learning abilities are 22 
costly, however, natural selection will favour simpler mechanisms for controlling behaviour when 23 
faced with uncertain conditions.  Here we show that, in a foraging context, a strategy based only on 24 
current energy reserves often performs almost as well as a Bayesian learning strategy that integrates 25 
all previous experiences to form an optimal estimate of environmental conditions. We find that 26 
Bayesian learning gives a strong advantage only if fluctuations in the food supply are very strong and 27 
reasonably frequent. The performance of both the Bayesian and the reserve-based strategy are more 28 
robust to inaccurate knowledge of the temporal pattern of environmental conditions than a strategy 29 
that has perfect knowledge about current conditions. Studies assuming Bayesian learning are often 30 
accused of being unrealistic; our results suggest that animals can achieve a similar level of 31 
performance to Bayesians using much simpler mechanisms based on their physiological state. More 32 
broadly, our work suggests that the ability to use internal states as a source of information about 33 
recent environmental conditions will have weakened selection for sophisticated learning and decision-34 
making systems.  35 
 36 
Keywords: behavioural gambit, cognition, computational costs, decision-making, information use, 37 
optimal foraging.   38 
Page 2 of 24
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/prsb
Submitted to Proceedings of the Royal Society B: For Review Only
 Information in physiology 3 
 
INTRODUCTION  39 
 40 
“Il meglio è nemico del bene” [The best is enemy of the good] 41 
       Italian proverb 42 
  43 
The study of animal decision-making has typically taken an optimisation approach in which the 44 
animal is assumed to have perfect knowledge of current and long-term conditions [1–4]. In reality, 45 
animals will be uncertain about conditions [5]. Such uncertainty can be incorporated into evolutionary 46 
models using Bayes’ rule, which updates knowledge given new information in a logically consistent 47 
way [6,7], invoking the behavioural gambit [8] that animals will behave as though they can perform 48 
Bayesian calculations [9,10]. However, it remains unclear how most animals could approximate 49 
Bayesian learning without invoking implausible computational abilities or excessively costly 50 
physiological or cognitive mechanisms that would require a large brain. For a mechanism to be 51 
favoured by selection, there needs to be sufficient advantage to the animal in terms of reproductive 52 
success to offset the costs of the mechanism. In many situations a simpler but less accurate 53 
mechanism, determining a ‘rule of thumb’ or heuristic, might be advantageous if it has a smaller cost 54 
[11]. An example is simple learning rules based on a linear operator [12]. Such rules may also be 55 
more robust than Bayesian learning, in that their performance is less affected if information is 56 
imperfect [12,13] 57 
 58 
One of the best-studied situations in decision-making is searching for food [4,14,15]. Described rules 59 
of thumb include the ‘two-strikes’ rule that bees (Bombus lapidarius) appear to follow in making 60 
patch-quitting decisions [16]; the animal acts as though it has a fixed memory window for foraging 61 
success, such as remembering whether or not it found food on the last few occasions that it looked. 62 
Another example is the constant time in patches used by caddis fly larvae (Plectrocnemia conspersa) 63 
[17]; here the animal acts as though it keeps track of time and ignores changes in conditions. Both 64 
methods may lead to behaviour that is similar to a more sophisticated system that tracks food 65 
availability explicitly [16,17].  66 
 67 
To behave optimally in different conditions, the animal needs some way of assessing current 68 
conditions. In the case of foraging, the animal discovers food items stochastically, which does not 69 
necessarily reflect the overall food abundance at that point in time. Animals therefore need some way 70 
to integrate past events, but acquiring and processing information in a Bayesian way is likely to be 71 
costly [18]. Instead, natural selection could exploit the fact that animals have internal states that are a 72 
potential source of information about conditions. All else being equal, energetic reserves tend to 73 
increase if food is abundant and fall if food is scarce. Since conditions are positively autocorrelated 74 
over time in most natural environments, conditions in the recent past are informative of current 75 
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conditions [5]. As such, reserves could act as a physiological ‘memory’ of environmental conditions 76 
and so indicate current conditions [19]. 77 
 78 
Here, we show that energy reserves, a physiological state, provides a simple yet surprisingly effective 79 
cue to decide how intensively to forage for food. For clarity, we use a simple model of survival in a 80 
fluctuating environment (i.e. the generalised risk allocation model of [20]), where food availability 81 
varies over time. We characterise the animal’s environment in terms of the distribution, variability 82 
and abundance of food items. We investigate under what conditions we expect animals to behave as 83 
though they have sophisticated learning mechanisms for assessing current conditions, when they 84 
should have simpler mechanisms, and when they should ignore fluctuations in conditions altogether. 85 
To predict the outcome of natural selection it would be necessary to quantify the cost of mental 86 
mechanisms, but this is currently not possible. We therefore compare the survivorship of various 87 
candidate mechanisms to understand when sophisticated mechanisms give large benefits, in which 88 
case animals are unlikely to have simple mechanisms. We find that, across a wide range of situations, 89 
a strategy based only on the level of reserves performs almost as well as optimal Bayesian learning, 90 
despite being much simpler, because reserve level acts as a memory. We discuss how such 91 
mechanisms may operate in non-foraging contexts too, and suggest that physiological states acting as 92 
‘memories’ may be ubiquitous.  93 
 94 
THE MODEL  95 
 96 
We are interested in the foraging strategy that maximizes survival in a temporally changing 97 
environment where death can occur through starvation or predation. One possible response to harsh 98 
conditions is to cease activity and wait for better times but the consequences of this for the forager’s 99 
survival and future state will depend on its current reserves. We therefore use a state-dependent model 100 
in which the optimal action is allowed to depend on both the current conditions and the current level 101 
of reserves. We model behaviour over a long sequence of discrete time steps. The animal and its 102 
environment are characterized by two states: its level of reserves x (x≥0) and the current 103 
environmental conditions E where food availability is higher in good conditions (E=G) than bad 104 
conditions (E=B). Food availability differs only in the maximum probability of finding food when 105 
foraging (γG and γB, where γG ≥ γB).  106 
 107 
The food availability of the environment is assumed to fluctuate over time. Incorporating 108 
environmental heterogeneity into models of adaptive behaviour requires the inclusion of an 109 
environmental state variable [5]. Often we can capture sufficient complexity with just two possible 110 
environmental states A and B, such as high and low food availability. Next, we characterise stochastic 111 
transitions between the two environmental states. The simplest case is where the probability of 112 
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transition (per unit time) between states depends only on the current state. At the end of a time step, 113 
we assume that the environment changes from the current conditions E to the alternative conditions 114 
with probability λE. Thus a good environment becomes a bad environment with probability λG, while a 115 
bad environment becomes a good environment with probability λB. The duration of good and bad 116 
periods both follow a geometric distribution whose mean is the reciprocal of the transition 117 
probabilities, which we term tG and tB respectively. Note that this environment will show positive 118 
temporal autocorrelation if λB + λG < 1 because then conditions are more likely to stay the same than 119 
to change [5]. 120 
 121 
The aspect of behaviour we are interested in is foraging intensity, which we call f (0 ≤ f ≤ 1). 122 
Increasing f increases the probability of finding food but also increases exposure to predators and 123 
hence the probability of being attacked. We assume that while the animal is not foraging, it is safe 124 
from predation. We also assume that predation risk when foraging increases with energy reserves x 125 
because of decreasing manoeuvrability [21]. Regardless of the exact cost, some cost needs to be 126 
assumed if long-term adaptive fat levels are to be stable [22]. In a given time step, the probability of 127 
mortality of the animal due to predation (µ) is given by  128 





 +=
s
xdffx c
2
1),(µ
 (1) 129 
where c controls how the risk increases with f, d is the maximum probability of predation attack, and s 130 
is the maximum reserve level . We assume that the forager uses m units of energy per time step on 131 
metabolism and finds a food item with probability γEf. For computational reasons there is some 132 
variance in the energy content of food items (see Online Appendix): food items contain either b1 or b2 133 
units of energy; for the results shown in the main text we assume that items with energy b1=5 and 134 
b2=6 occur with equal probability. The reserves at the next time step are therefore 135 
 
mbxx jtt −+=+1  136 
after a successful discovery of food item of type j (j=1,2), and  137 
mxx tt −=+1  138 
after a failure to find food. If xt=0 then xt+1=0 because the animal is dead.  139 
 140 
A strategy specifies how f depends on circumstances (e.g. reserves, information). We find optimal 141 
strategies of various classes, all of which minimise the mortality rate and so maximise the survival 142 
probability over a long time period. The classes of strategy differ in the constraints on the information 143 
available to the forager. Where the current environmental state E is known (perfect information) this 144 
is the generalised risk allocation model [20]. Where E is not known, the forager may be able to 145 
estimate it based on available cues. To model this, we include a state variable ρ to represent the 146 
Page 5 of 24
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/prsb
Submitted to Proceedings of the Royal Society B: For Review Only
 Information in physiology 6 
 
forager’s estimated probability that conditions are currently good (i.e. that E = G). Here we find the 147 
optimal strategy f* from two classes of strategy in which information is imperfect: (i) the animal 148 
estimates the probability ρ that conditions are currently good directly from its foraging experiences, 149 
using Bayesian updating; (ii) the animal does not monitor its foraging experiences directly but is 150 
sensitive to its current energy reserves, and can take into account the fact that the level of reserves is 151 
informative of recent conditions to estimate ρ. Assuming that the forager is optimally adapted to 152 
minimize its long-term mortality rate, we use dynamic programming to find optimal solutions given 153 
the constraints on information (see Appendix A). We set other parameter values (m, d, c, bj) such that 154 
the risk of mortality over some long time period is realistic. If each time step is thought of as around 155 
one hour then 2000 time steps represent around 100 days of winter, over which the animals try to 156 
survive. Small birds in temperate regions survive winter with 50-70% probability [23–25], so we tune 157 
the parameters such that the survival at the baseline parameter values is around this range. As 158 
mortality is far from both zero and one this ensures that the model can make clear predictions about 159 
the effects of the parameter values of interest on the performance of the various strategies.  160 
 161 
We compare the performance of these constrained optimal strategies to two other classes of strategy 162 
that would be optimal if the environmental conditions were unchanging: 163 
(1) A ‘pessimistic’ class of strategy that behaves as though the food availability is constantly low (γB). 164 
(We do not show results for the alternative ‘optimistic’ strategy that behaves as though food 165 
availability is constantly high (γG), because it performs very poorly in all non-trivial conditions.) .  166 
(2) An optimally biased strategy that behaves as though the food availability is high with a fixed 167 
probability and low otherwise, where the fixed probability is that which is optimal, and so will have 168 
been naturally selected for in the absence of any attempt to track food availability.  169 
 170 
Thus, in summary we compare the performance of five classes of strategy:  171 
• Perfect (P): Forager has perfect knowledge about current food availability.  172 
• Bayesian (L): Forager uses Bayes’ theorem to estimate current food availability directly from 173 
its foraging experiences.  174 
• Reserves (R): Forager does not monitor its foraging experiences but can base its decisions on 175 
its current reserve level; note that, through natural selection, the response to reserves will be 176 
influenced by the conditional probability that food availability is high given the reserve level.  177 
• Pessimist (S): Forager behaves as though the current food availability is always low. 178 
• Optimal bias (U): Forager behaves as though the current food availability is high with a fixed 179 
probability ρ*, which is the estimate that minimizes the long-term mortality rate.   180 
 181 
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For each class, we find the optimal foraging strategy as a function of reserves and information state. 182 
We then assess the resulting survival over 2000 time steps starting from the stationary distribution of 183 
x in the population. To do this, we simulate a population following the optimal strategy until the 184 
distribution of individuals stops changing, rescale so the size of the population is unity, and then run 185 
for 2000 time steps to determine the survival probability Q(i), where i indicates one of the strategy 186 
classes as shown above. All parameters and their baseline values are shown in Table 1.  187 
 188 
RESULTS  189 
 190 
When using the reserve-based strategy (class R) the probability that conditions are good as a function 191 
of reserves x is shown in Figure 1. For all parameter settings the probability follows a sigmoid curve, 192 
with a low probability that conditions are good at low reserves and a high probability at high reserves, 193 
because reserves gradually build up when food is abundant and decrease when food is scarce. The 194 
curve shifts to the right as the difference between γG and γB increases because the optimal strategy is to 195 
store more reserves in good conditions to prepare for bad conditions. The steepness of the sigmoid 196 
curve depends on the fluctuation rate (Figure B1).  197 
 198 
The optimal foraging intensity f* for all five strategy classes is shown in Figure 2 for the baseline 199 
parameter values (with the differences in foraging intensity plotted in Figure B2). As we have shown 200 
previously [20] there is a crossover point in the optimal intensity of foraging under perfect 201 
information f*P (grey lines), with more intense foraging when food availability is low if reserves are 202 
low [f*P(x,B)>f*P(x,G) when x<30], but less intense foraging when food availability is low if reserves 203 
are high [f*P(x,B)<f*P(x,G) when x≥30]. A pessimist has f*S that is too high because it doesn’t expect 204 
good conditions to occur at all. For the reserve-based optimal strategy, foraging intensity f*R is similar 205 
to f*P(x,B) when reserves are low and closer to f*P(x,G) when reserves are high (cf. grey and dotted 206 
lines). This is intuitive, because the lower the reserve level, the more likely it is that conditions are 207 
bad, hence the animal should behave as though conditions are bad; whereas if reserves are high it is 208 
likely that conditions are good, hence the animal should behave as though conditions are good. For 209 
the Bayesian learning strategy, f*L is similar to f*P(x,B) when the posterior probability that conditions 210 
are currently good ρ is zero and similar to f*P(x,G) when ρ is unity, with a gradual change in f*L for 211 
intermediate ρ (Figure B3).  212 
 213 
We assess the probability of surviving 2000 time steps for each optimal strategy under various 214 
conditions (Figure 3; shown for γB=0.25 and γG=0.75, for other values see Figure B4). For clarity we 215 
first show survival under perfect knowledge (P, which always does best) and then the differences 216 
between the various strategies. Survival always increases with the mean duration of good periods and 217 
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decreases with the mean duration of bad periods because mortality mostly occurs in bad periods, and 218 
the length of these therefore determines survival (Figure 3a, Figure B4a-e). Survival decreases as the 219 
difference in food availability increases because that determines the severity of bad periods, except 220 
that survival increases with the difference in food availability if conditions are good most of the time 221 
(cf. Figure B4a, d), because the increased rate of gain in good periods more than compensates for this 222 
and risk allocation has a large benefit.  223 
 224 
In general, the difference in survival between perfect knowledge (P) and the information-constrained 225 
strategies (L, R) is much less than 5% for most conditions. L (Bayesian learning) does worst compared 226 
to P when periods are short because it is impossible to learn fast enough to perform risk allocation 227 
effectively (Figure 3b, B4f-j); this is exacerbated when food availability differs markedly between 228 
good and bad conditions (Figure B4j). Across parameter space there is strikingly little difference 229 
between L and the reserve-based strategy R (Figure 3c, B4k-o), except when periods are moderately 230 
short (around 20 time steps) and the difference in food availability between conditions is very large 231 
(Figure B4o). R does much better than U (optimal bias) when periods are long and of roughly equal 232 
duration, because then it is most important to do the correct thing (Figure 3d, B4p–t). The optimal 233 
estimate ρ* under the U strategy is always smaller than the actual ρ (Figure B5). This is because 234 
eating too much in good conditions is less deleterious than eating too little in poor conditions.  235 
 236 
In Figure 4 we clarify the conditions under which a learning (L) or reserve-based (R) strategy should 237 
evolve, under the arbitrary assumption that L is twice as costly as R. We expect sophisticated learning 238 
to be worth this additional cost when periods are moderately short and food availability changes 239 
greatly (bottom-left of Figure 4b, d) or when the fluctuations are subtle and infrequent (top-right 240 
Figure 4a). We expect the reserve-based strategy to be favoured if the world is not predominantly 241 
poor or rich (i.e. along the main diagonal of Figure 4) and does not change too quickly (not the 242 
bottom-left). This is because R does not adapt fast enough when conditions turn bad and so the animal 243 
is more likely to die; in this situation, either L or U does better. In all other cases, decisions based 244 
solely on the current reserve level allow the animal to perform almost as well as a sophisticated 245 
Bayesian learning strategy, with differences less than 1% in most of parameter space, and 0.04% for 246 
the baseline parameter values.  247 
 248 
For the results above we assumed that γG+γB=1. However, the difference between L and R remains 249 
small for almost all combinations of γG and γB (Figure B6). We have also confirmed that the results are 250 
not sensitive to our assumptions about the variance in energy consumption over time (Figure B7). We 251 
did this by increasing the energy content of food items bj while decreasing their rate of discovery γG 252 
and γB, such that the total amount of energy in the environment remained constant but the variance 253 
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increased (implying longer periods without eating). The results are almost unchanged across the full 254 
range of the proportion of food that occurs under good conditions (Figure B7).   255 
  256 
In addition to having imperfect knowledge about current conditions, a forager’s perception of the 257 
pattern of environmental change may be prone to error. This may be the case because of dispersal or 258 
because anthropogenic change is altering environments faster than animals can adapt [26]. To 259 
investigate this, we assess the performance of the same five strategy classes in an environment that 260 
fluctuates on a different timescale from that to which the forager is adapted. In Figure 5 we present 261 
the survivorship relative to the P case when the strategy is mismatched for the change probabilities 262 
(for absolute values see Figure B8). Overall the survival of P is poorer than that of R and L if the 263 
perceived rate of environmental change is different to the actual rate. This occurs because the optimal 264 
decision depends on the forager’s current state and its expectations about the future; if those 265 
expectations are wrong then performance will be poor. This is ameliorated if the forager can adjust its 266 
expectations via learning or other changes in state, which are influenced by the real conditions. At the 267 
extreme, if the forager expects periods to be long then the performance of P worsens as the actual 268 
period durations decrease (Figure B8), whereas performance improves for L and R (Figure 5g. If the 269 
actual duration of periods is much longer than expected then it would be better to act as though 270 
conditions are always poor (S) (Figure 5b, d, f), but there is always a range of perceived durations 271 
where L and R outperform P. When the expected durations are quite inaccurate, the actual durations 272 
determine whether R outperforms L or vice versa: if the actual durations are long, reserves become a 273 
reliable cue of current conditions (Figure 5a, d), whereas if the actual durations are short the Bayesian 274 
strategy performs better (Figure 5f, h). 275 
  276 
The maintained reserve level is similar under L and R but slightly shifted to lower reserves compared 277 
to P for baseline parameter values (Figure B9). Storing a lower level of reserves is predicted across 278 
most of parameter space (Figure B10), except where there is a very strong difference in food 279 
availability between good and bad conditions and conditions change slowly (Figure B10b, f) or when 280 
conditions are more often good (Figure B10d, h). Across all of parameter space, reserves under L are 281 
closer to those under P than R, explaining the slightly better performance of L.  282 
 283 
DISCUSSION 284 
 285 
The need to track and respond appropriately to environmental conditions generates an important 286 
selective pressure on sensory and cognitive systems. Animals typically do not have perfect knowledge 287 
[27]. While foraging they may learn about the current food availability, but because food discovery is 288 
stochastic there is uncertainty. Given this uncertainty, animals are likely to have decision rules that 289 
perform well in most conditions [8,11,28]. The level of sophistication of these rules will depend on 290 
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their associated costs and the benefit of tracking the environment. Here we have compared the 291 
performance of a number of implementations of possible foraging mechanisms in an environment 292 
with fluctuating food availability. Our findings suggest that a Bayesian learning strategy—a 293 
commonly used paradigm in research on learning [6,9,12,29] but one which is arguably implausible 294 
for real organisms [6,7] (but see [9,10])—is unlikely to evolve under most conditions, because a 295 
simpler decision rule based solely on current energy reserves could allow the animal to perform 296 
almost as well. The greatest benefit to distinguishing between conditions occurs when the 297 
environment fluctuates slowly, but in this case there is ample time for energetic reserves to respond to 298 
current conditions before they change, and so most of the time the reserve level will be a sufficiently 299 
reliable indicator of current conditions. The ability to behave appropriately using only energy reserves 300 
as a cue is likely to have greatly reduced the selective pressure for sophisticated learning systems.  301 
 302 
Bayesian learning might still be advantageous if other classes of strategy are very expensive, if there 303 
is a strong difference between conditions (making it more important to adjust behaviour accordingly) 304 
and if conditions change sufficiently fast that reserves are an unreliable cue to current conditions. This 305 
perspective suggests that animals in strongly and quickly fluctuating environments might be better at 306 
learning, which contradicts the suggestion that learning is favoured under intermediate rates of change 307 
[30,31]; note that these previous studies did not consider simpler alternative mechanisms. Strikingly, 308 
we predict that animals should be insensitive to some types of environmental fluctuations, such as if 309 
the fluctuations are not very large, or fluctuations are very quick, or if the world is usually in one state 310 
or the other. The latter result is predicted because if food conditions are dominated by one level of 311 
availability, then animals can just behave as though this is always the case. With fast changes or 312 
changes of small magnitude it is less important to be sensitive to changes in food availability because 313 
current conditions do not provide much information about future conditions [20]. In experiments that 314 
have found no response to changing conditions [32], it is important to consider whether the study 315 
organism is adapted to an environment in which there is limited benefit of responding to changes.  316 
In some situations, such as when the level of food availability changes frequently, it may be that the 317 
animal should do the same thing in the different conditions [20]. In such cases, an evolved mechanism 318 
may implement some simpler rule that does not try to track conditions (U). This may underlie state-319 
dependent valuation of food sources because an animal’s state may reflect what conditions were 320 
generally like when particular sources were exploited [33]. 321 
 322 
The reserve-based strategy class may be the most likely evolutionary outcome in most situations. 323 
Even the simple rule (U) requires a basic sensitivity to reserve level to avoid starvation, and the 324 
reserve-based strategy is unlikely to involve significant additional costs. Thus, animals will not 325 
necessarily carry the level of reserves predicted by standard models that assume perfect knowledge or 326 
Bayesian learning, but instead may make systematic deviations because they are using reserves as a 327 
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source of information. We predict that these deviations will be positive (more reserves than predicted 328 
by perfect information models) when conditions change slowly (Figure B10a) but negative when 329 
conditions change quickly (Figure B10c). There may be no need for a cognitively encoded memory of 330 
recent foraging experiences; natural selection will simply exploit information by favouring an 331 
adaptive response to energetic reserves. In effect, the animal’s reserves act as a physiological memory 332 
of past events. This suggestion could be tested empirically in systems where foraging experiences can 333 
be decoupled from the perceived level of reserves, for example through experimental manipulation of 334 
hormones such as ghrelin and leptin that are involved in the regulation of feeding behaviour. By 335 
manipulating hormone levels and foraging experiences independently of each other, it should be 336 
possible to determine whether foraging behaviour is controlled by a cognitively encoded memory, a 337 
reserve-based memory or some combination of the two. 338 
 339 
Lea and colleagues [34] assessed the performance of cognitive mechanisms for solving the explore-340 
exploit trade-off. They found that a simple decision rule can perform better than more sophisticated 341 
strategies in some conditions, such as where there is insufficient time to learn about current 342 
conditions, which is comparable to the poor performance of our Bayesian learning strategy when 343 
fluctuations are frequent. However, the choice of foraging currency is likely to be crucial for the 344 
insights obtained [15], and often maximisation of net rate as assumed by Lea et al. [34] will make 345 
substantially different predictions to currencies that incorporate the risk of mortality that most 346 
foragers face [15,35]. Future theoretical work should consider how a foraging rule based on 347 
physiological state, such as a hormone level, performs relative to a cognitive mechanism that attempts 348 
to learn about the level of predation risk from direct experiences (e.g. sightings of predators).   349 
 350 
Learning rules that maximise long-term reward rate by learning about conditions can perform much 351 
better than ignorant rules [36,37]. But these rule sets have not accounted for the fact that internal state, 352 
such as the level of energy reserves or body temperature, always provides animals with some 353 
information and we expect natural selection to have formed strategies that exploit all sources of 354 
information about the external conditions. Several models have shown that an animal’s state should 355 
influence decision-making to the extent that behaviour may appear irrational [38–41]. Here, we have 356 
identified that the effect of energetic reserves may be more complex still: animals with equal levels of 357 
reserves may differ in their response if they are adapted to different environments, such as different 358 
rates of change, because of how this affects the information content [20].  359 
 
360 
The marginal value theorem predicts that the marginal capture rate for leaving patches of prey should 361 
be higher when the overall prey abundance is higher, but this is often not observed [42]. A simple rule 362 
of thumb of a constant giving-up time results in behaviour that approximates the optimal solution 363 
much of the time [17,43,44]. Such a rule may be driven by some internal physiological state, 364 
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involving feedback from the gustatory system, which reflects the time since the last prey item was 365 
consumed. Nonacs [45] showed that including a forager’s energy reserves alters the predictions of the 366 
marginal value theorem, but he also assumed animals could keep track of foraging success in a perfect 367 
way. We suggest that a better approach may be to model a gustatory state, such as stomach contents, 368 
which the animal can use as a cue of foraging success. Our reserve-based approach could be used to 369 
incorporate information constraints in many established models of animal behaviour and decision-370 
making.  371 
 372 
There is currently much interest and concern about the ability of organisms to cope with human-373 
induced rapid environmental change [46]. Such rapid changes will cause there to be a mismatch 374 
between the conditions that animals have evolved to deal with and those they actually experience. Our 375 
results (Figure 5) suggest that the details of how the environment has changed will determine how 376 
organisms respond. Interestingly, if environmental change causes conditions to fluctuate more quickly 377 
or more slowly than in the evolutionary past—for example, because it leads to more extreme weather 378 
patterns—then organisms that can perceive the current conditions directly (P) may in fact perform 379 
worse than those that use simple rules to estimate current conditions (Figure 5). Which strategy class 380 
performs best depends on whether fluctuations are more or less frequent: if conditions now change 381 
more quickly than in the past then learning does best (left of Figure 5c), whereas if conditions change 382 
more slowly then simpler (e.g. reserve-based) strategy classes not based on learning do best (right of 383 
Figure 5c).  384 
 385 
We have shown that, in a foraging context, a behavioural strategy based only on an internal 386 
physiological state (R) can perform so well that more sophisticated strategies, such as learning directly 387 
from foraging outcomes (L) or accurately perceiving current conditions (P), might not provide 388 
sufficient advantages to offset their costs. It is striking that a reserve-based strategy is more robust to 389 
error in the pattern of environmental fluctuations than a rule based on perfect information about 390 
current food availability. Therefore, if the information about the environment is unreliable, we expect 391 
selection to favour simpler strategy classes. So far, we have been unable to prove that our 392 
methodology for finding the best-performing reserve-based strategy actually converges on the global 393 
optimum, rather than a local optimum (See Figure B11). However, if it is just a local optimum, then 394 
our conclusions would be strengthened: the performance of the reserve-based strategy at its global 395 
optimum (elsewhere in N-dimensional space) would be even better than the one we have described 396 
here, and hence even closer to the performance of the Bayesian learning strategy. 397 
 398 
Similar principles could well apply in other (non-foraging) contexts: any physiological or 399 
psychological state variable that is altered by experience might function as an efficient integrator (a 400 
‘memory’) of past experiences. An obvious candidate is emotions and moods, which have been 401 
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modelled mechanistically [47] and may help an animal to adjust its behaviour adaptively when 402 
conditions are uncertain [48,49]. In fact, in non-foraging contexts, the state variable may have greater 403 
flexibility to act as a cue because (unlike energy reserves) the animal doesn’t necessarily depend on it 404 
for survival, so it could potentially evolve to be more informative than energy reserves are in the 405 
foraging case. One intriguing possibility is that emotional states were initially unavoidable 406 
consequences of levels of neurotransmitter activity, but have been modified by selection to provide 407 
more reliable information about recent experiences and thereby influence cognitive decisions. If the 408 
principle we have highlighted applies to most physiological states then organisms may often appear to 409 
be cognitively sophisticated despite basing their decisions on relatively simple mechanisms. Since 410 
internal states can summarise a great deal of information about the environmental conditions, they 411 
will reduce the selective pressure to learn directly from the immediate outcomes of decisions. Animals 412 
are therefore likely to be cognitively unsophisticated when they are able to perform well using simple 413 
mechanisms. 414 
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Figure Legends 546 
Figure 1: Probability that conditions are good given current reserves x under the reserve-based 547 
strategy R, ρ(G|x). The values on each line indicate the difference between conditions in food 548 
availability γG – γB, where γG+γB=1. Mean duration of bad and good periods: tB=tG=0.005.  549 
 550 
Figure 2: The optimal foraging intensity (f*) as a function of energy reserves (x) for the perfect 551 
information (grey lines: PG solid, PB dashed), reserve-based (R), pessimistic (S) and optimal bias (U) 552 
cases. For the optimal Bayesian learning strategy (L), the values of fL* are intermediate to those for PG 553 
and PB (shown in Figure B3). 554 
 555 
Figure 3: Comparison of survival probabilities over 2000 time steps Q(i) for the various methods 556 
across parameter space (tB and tG shown on axes). We show results for the baseline probability of 557 
finding food in the two conditions (γB=0.25, γG=0.75); for other values see Figure B4. (a) Survival 558 
under perfect information (P). (b, c, d) Differences in survival between strategies (b) P and L 559 
(Bayesian learner); (c) L and R (reserve-based); (d) R and U (optimal bias). Note the different scales 560 
of the vertical axes. 561 
 562 
Figure 4: Best strategy class under varying costs of implementation. For comparison, we assumed that 563 
the reserve-based (R) strategy pays an arbitrary survival cost ψ
 
per time step whereas the Bayesian 564 
learning (L) strategy pays kψ; the optimal bias (U) and pessimistic (S) strategies pay no cost. We 565 
assume that the P strategy cannot evolve. The shaded regions indicate which strategy (L, R or U) has 566 
highest survival given these costs for (a, b) ψ=0.001 and (c, d)  ψ=0.004, and for (a, c) γB=0.35, 567 
γG=0.65 and (b, d) γB=0.15, γG=0.85, with k  = 2 in all panels. The results do not qualitatively depend 568 
on the values of ψ or k, with an intuitive gradual shrinking of the L region as k (relative cost of 569 
Bayesian learning compared to a reserve-based strategy) increases.  570 
 571 
Figure 5: Probability of surviving 2000 time steps Q(i) when the actual fluctuation rates differ from 572 
those the animal is adapted to. Survival is plotted as the difference compared to survival under perfect 573 
knowledge (P); negative values imply lower survival as a result of imperfect knowledge about current 574 
conditions (different lines for strategies L, R, S and U). Left column (a, c, e, g) shows relative survival 575 
as a function of the actual mean duration of periods (x-axis) when following the optimal strategy for 576 
the duration shown on the panels. Right column (b, d, f, h) shows survival as a function of the mean 577 
duration of periods to which the animal is adapted (x-axis) in four environments with different actual 578 
mean durations (shown on the panels). (a, b) tB=tG=2000; (c, d) tB=tG=200; (e, f) tB=tG=20; (g, h) 579 
tB=tG=2.  580 
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Table 1: Parameters in the model and their default values 581 
Symbol Description Value 
s Maximum level of reserves 100 
m Energy use per unit time 1 
bj Energy in food item type j  5, 6  
d Magnitude of predation risk 0.002 
c Power of relationship between foraging and predation risk 2 
ψ Survival cost per time step for reserve-based strategies 0.001, 0.004 
k Relative cost of Bayesian compared to reserve-based strategy 2 
γE Probability of finding food per unit time spent foraging in 
environment in condition E 
γG = 0.7, γB = 0.3 
 
λE Probability that environment in condition E changes to the other 
condition 
λG = 0.01, λB=0.01 
tE Mean number of time steps for which environment stays in 
condition E (tE = 1/λE) 
tG = 100, tB = 100 
 582 
 583 
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Figure 1: Probability that conditions are good given current reserves x under the reserve-based strategy R, 
ρ(G|x). The values on each line indicate the difference between conditions in food availability γG – γB, 
where γG+γB=1. Mean duration of bad and good periods: tB=tG=0.005.  
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Figure 2: The optimal foraging intensity (f*) as a function of energy reserves (x) for the perfect information 
(grey lines: PG solid, PB dashed), reserve-based (R), pessimistic (S) and optimal bias (U) cases. For the 
optimal Bayesian learning strategy (L), the values of fL* are intermediate to those for PG and PB (shown in 
Figure B3).  
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Figure 3: Comparison of survival probabilities over 2000 time steps Q(i) for the various methods across 
parameter space (tB and tG shown on axes). We show results for the baseline probability of finding food in 
the two conditions (γB=0.25, γG=0.75); for other values see Figure B4. (a) Survival under perfect 
information (P). (b, c, d) Differences in survival between strategies (b) P and L (Bayesian learner); (c) L and 
R (reserve-based); (d) R and U (optimal bias). Note the different scales of the vertical axes.  
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Figure 4: Best strategy class under varying costs of implementation. For comparison, we assumed that the 
reserve-based (R) strategy pays an arbitrary survival cost ψ per time step whereas the Bayesian learning 
(L) strategy pays kψ; the optimal bias (U) and pessimistic (S) strategies pay no cost. We assume that the P 
strategy cannot evolve. The shaded regions indicate which strategy (L, R or U) has highest survival given 
these costs for (a, b) ψ=0.001 and (c, d)  ψ=0.004, and for (a, c) γB=0.35, γG=0.65 and (b, d) γB=0.15, 
γG=0.85, with k  = 2 in all panels. The results do not qualitatively depend on the values of ψ or k, with an 
intuitive gradual shrinking of the L region as k (relative cost of Bayesian learning compared to a reserve-
based strategy) increases.  
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Figure 5: Probability of surviving 2000 time steps Q(i) when the actual fluctuation rates differ from those the 
animal is adapted to. Survival is plotted as the difference compared to survival under perfect knowledge (P); 
negative values imply lower survival as a result of imperfect knowledge about current conditions (different 
lines for strategies L, R, S and U). Left column (a, c, e, g) shows relative survival as a function of the actual 
mean duration of periods (x-axis) when following the optimal strategy for the duration shown on the panels. 
Right column (b, d, f, h) shows survival as a function of the mean duration of periods to which the animal is 
adapted (x-axis) in four environments with different actual mean durations (shown on the panels). (a, b) 
tB=tG=2000; (c, d) tB=tG=200; (e, f) tB=tG=20; (g, h) tB=tG=2.  
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